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This paper analyzes the impact of di¤erent production technologies across
countries on the relative prices of goods and through them on the pattern of
trade. It assumes di¤erent production technologies and perfect capital mobility
across OECD countries during the period, 1970-1992. These assumptions are
consistent with the Kemp-Jones model. The econometric estimation of sector-
speci…c production functions (at 2-digit classi…cation of ISDB) for each of 14
OECD countries shows that changes in comparative advantage in the 1970s
and 1980s are highly correlated with changes in technological progress (in light
industries) and in the capital-labor ratio (in heavy industries).
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Throughout the development of trade theories since the beginning of the last century,
the key factors that each trade theory used to explain the pattern of trade re‡ected
the initial conditions prevailing at the time and stylized facts re‡ecting these condi-
tions. For instance, when there was a large volume of exports of goods from countries
with absolute disadvantage, Ricardo (1817) explained the pattern of trade with com-
parative advantage in relative labor productivity. His focus on relative labor costs
re‡ected the labour theory of value, which was the dominant theoretical framework
at the time. In the …rst half of this century, when goods became much more mobile
across boarders (while factors of production remained highly immobile), Heckscher
(1919), Ohlin (1933) and many others suggested that trade was a substitute for factor
movements. They argued that goods were traded so that factors (as the contents of
goods) could be shipped from where they were relatively abundant to where they
were relatively scarce. In more recent years, when the volume of intra-industry trade
became the dominant portion of the total trade volume, trade theorists such as Krug-
man began to analyze each country’s demand behavior for foreign goods, each of
which could be uniquely produced by di¤erent foreign countries. To understand the
world in which these theories have been developed is very important for the choice of
theoretical framework for any empirical studies.
This study is interested in the pattern of trade of 10 traded good sectors (at 2 digit
classi…cation of International Sectoral Data Base (ISDB)) among 14 OECD countries
2during the period, 1970-92.1 In the analysis of the pattern of trade among this par-
ticular set of countries during this particular period, there are two important features
one must take into account. First of all, countries di¤er in factor productivity, namely
labor and capital productivity. More speci…cally, we observe di¤erent countries pos-
sessing, not necessarily di¤erent production technologies (because of relatively easy
transmission of information among them), but di¤erent e¢ciency levels of labor and
capital inputs. Di¤erences in productivity among industrialized countries are well
discussed in the empirical growth literature, for instance Baskin and Lau (1992). Sec-
ondly, capital mobility among industrialized countries has been very high. The high
level of capital mobility, particularly in the 1980s, is discussed in many of the Foreign
Direct Investment literature, reviewed in Saito (1998). The choice of a theoretical
framework for this paper is based on how closely these two features are modelled.
The theoretical model adopted in this paper is developed by Kemp (1966), Jones
(1967), Jones and Ru¢n (1975) and others. In the Kemp-Jones model, technologi-
cal di¤erences and perfect capital mobility across countries are introduced into the
Heckscher-Ohlin model. The model shows that trade patterns in such a world is “Ri-
cardian” since they re‡ect technology di¤erences rather than factor endowments. In
other words, the analysis of comparative advantage among OECD countries could be
adequately carried out by analyzing di¤erences in labor productivity among OECD
countries.
1In the international trade literature, particularly in recent years, some have dealt with a 3-digit
ISDB classi…cation level, for instance Dunkin and Krygier (1998). This paper, however, faces a
data constraint in the sector level capital input data, which is used to estimate the technological
parameters, as in the case of Harrigan (1997).
3Adopting the Kemp-Jones model, and hence analyzing di¤erences in labor produc-
tivity, is consistent with what we have been observing in the empirical Heckscher-Ohlin
literature. Tre‡er (1995) rejected the Heckscher-Ohlin model in favor of alternative
models that took account of the home bias (Armington bias) in consumption and
international technology di¤erences. In his study, he used the 1983 data for 33 coun-
tries with 9 factors. Maskus and Webster (1995) also looked at both di¤erences in
consumption behavior and technology for a smaller number of countries, the U.S. and
U.K., but for a …ner disaggregation of factors. They, too, rejected the Heckscher-
Ohlin theorem in favor of alternative models. Harrigan (1997) found both relative
technology and endowment di¤erences to be important determinations of specializa-
tion. He used industry-speci…c factors, capital and labor, for OECD countries to
compute the total factor productivity (TFP) as a technological parameter. This was
a new approach to the estimation of technology parameters, in comparison with ear-
lier works, which were based on input-output tables. In all of these studies, one of
the key element in explaining the pattern of trade is considered to be the di¤erences
in labor productivity.
Despite the generally agreed importance of di¤erences in labor productivity across
countries in international trade, a careful analysis of labor productivity is missing in
the empirical trade literature. Trade models typically predict that di¤erences in labor
productivity are derived from di¤erences in the rate of technical progress. Di¤erences
in the rate of technical progress are not necessarily the only source of di¤erences in
labor productivity. For instance, in the presence of any friction in labor mobility across
sectors (within a country), sector-speci…c wage rates may be changing at di¤erent
4rates. Changes in the sector-speci…c wage-rental ratio causes the capital-labor ratio
to change over time in each sector. Any increase in the capital-labor ratio could reduce
the labor cost component (and increase the capital cost component). In data, labor
cost reductions from technological progress cannot be distinguished from those from
an increase in the capital-labor ratio. This paper, by estimating sector- and country-
speci…c production functions, decomposes the di¤erences in labor productivity across
OECD countries into two components: one component captures the e¤ect of di¤erent
rates of technical progress on labor productivity, and the other picks up the e¤ect of
di¤erent capital-labor ratio on labor productivity.
This paper does not discuss one very important feature of the pattern of trade
among OECD countries; goods disaggregated at 2-digit classi…cation of ISDB are far
from homogenous. The heterogeneity of goods within each sector has been one of the
main pillars of the increasing-returns-to-scale trade literature and has been argued to
be the reason for the bulk of intra-industry trade among industrialized countries. Saito
(1999) incorporates di¤erences in each country’s demand behavior for foreign goods
to analyze the relationship between trade patterns and the comparative advantage
discussed in this paper.
Section 2 of this paper discusses the main theoretical framework, the Kemp-Jones
model, and the decomposition of di¤erences in labor productivity. Section 3 discusses
the estimation method and hypothesis tests for the sector- and country-speci…c pro-
duction functions. Since the results of this empirical study are broad and varied, the
following three representative topics are discussed in this paper. Section 4 analyzes
the comparative advantage between Japan and the U.S. It …nds that the selective
5technological improvements in Japan with respect to the U.S. during the 1970s and
1980s are observed to have led to a shift in comparative advantage in Japan from light
to heavy industries. Section 5 analyzes the extent of comparative advantage or dis-
advantage of the U.S. vis-à-vis other OECD countries sector by sector over the same
period. Technological progress in some sectors seems to have improved the U.S. com-
petitiveness, namely in the food, textile, chemical products and other manufacturing
products industries. Section 6 turns to the overall …ndings of the decomposition of
cross-country di¤erences in labor productivity (relative to those of other sectors within
each country). Cross-country di¤erences in relative labor productivity are highly cor-
related with (i) cross-country di¤erences in relative rates of technical progress in light
industries and (ii) cross-country di¤erences in the relative capital-labor ratio in heavy
industries. The …ndings in this section indicate that di¤erences in the capital-labor
ratio is a much more important determinant of comparative advantage in heavy in-
dustries, particularly the early 1990s. Section 7 presents the conclusions.
2. The Model
2.1. The Kemp-Jones Model
The Kemp-Jones model presented here is based on Ru¢n (1984). Let aLi and aKi
denote the labor and capital requirements for good i; respectively. When two goods,
labor-intensive good X1 and capital-intensive good X2, are both produced in an econ-
6omy, we know that competitive pricing requires:
aL1w + aK1r = 1; (2.1)
aL2w + aK2r = p;
where w, r and p are wage rates, rental rates and the price of X2; respectively. Let µji
denote the cost shares, e.g., µL1 = aL1w: By totally di¤erentiating (2.1) and letting ^
indicate the proportionate change in a variable, e.g., ^ w = @w
w ; we obtain:
µL1 ^ w + µK1^ r = ¼1; (2.2)
µL2 ^ w + µK2^ r = ¼2 + ^ p;
where ¼1 = ¡(µL1^ aL1 + µK1^ aK1) and ¼2 = ¡(µL2^ aL2 + µK2^ aK2): When there is
technical progress (that is to say that the percentage change in factor requirements
aji is negative), ¼i takes a positive value, ¼i ¸ 0. In other words, ¼i is the percentage
reduction in the cost of producing Xi due to reduction in the aji coe¢cients at
constant factor prices. 2
Solving (2.2) for ^ r yield:
^ r =
µL1(¼2 + ^ p) ¡ µL2¼1
µ
; µ = µK2 ¡ µK1 = µL1 ¡ µL2 > 0: (2.3)
2If we assume the Hick-Neutral technical progress, that is to assume that the rate of technical
progress in both labor and capital inputs are the same, then we have
¡(^ aL2µL2 + ^ aK2µK2) = ¡^ aL2(µL2 + µK2) = ¡^ aL2 = ¼2:
7Equation (2.3) gives us three important information.
First, when there is no technical progress (or cost reduction) in both sectors, ¼i = 0











This is equivalently shown in a positively sloped p ¡ r curve of Figure 1.
Secondly, technical progress with the following condition leads to a horizontal shift
of the p ¡ r curve to the right (^ r > 0); see Figure 1:
µL1¼2 ¡ µL2¼1 > 0: (2.4)






(1+¼i) represents the share of labor costs in sector i discounted by technological
progress.
Thirdly, suppose that there are two countries, home and foreign countries, with
di¤erent rates of technical progress, see Figure 2. Given that both countries face the
equilibrium rate of return on capital r¤ in the world market, the relative price of
capital-intensive good in foreign country pf is higher than that of home country ph,
resulting in the comparative advantage in the production of capital-intensive good in
home country.
8Along the line of equation (2.5), for any positive technical progress (¼A
i ¸ 0 for
both countries A = h and f and both sectors i = 1 and 2); the comparative advantage


























i ) represents the share of labor costs in sector i discounted by technological
progress for both countries A = h and f:
2.1.1. The Application: The Comparative Advantage Index (CAI)
The Kemp-Jones model suggests that the analysis on comparative advantage could
focus on the analysis on labor cost shares (relative to labor cost shares of other sector).
This is a useful result for two reasons. First, this result has empirical applicability
since the data on sector-speci…c labor cost are available. Secondly, it provides a
theoretical justi…cation for why we observe so much emphases on labor productivity
in trade disputes.. This section shows how the analytical framework of the Kemp-
Jones model could be implemented in data analyses.
We are interested in 10 traded good sectors (at 2 digit-classi…cation of International
Sectoral Data Base (ISDB)) for 14 OECD countries in this study. This data set
provides data on labor costs, which are the compensation of employees, for more than
two sectors and more than two countries, home and foreign countries. Equation (2.6)
is, therefore, expressed in a more explicit form. For all countries m and n (indicated
by superscripts) and for all sectors i and j (indicated by subscripts), the Comparative

































i stands for wage rates, labor inputs and output of country m(or
n) for sector i(or j): If CAI
mn
ij is negative, then the p¡r curve for country m is below
that of country n. For a given level of r¤; the price of good i (relative to good j) in
country m is lower than that in country n; giving the comparative advantage of the
production of good i in country m.
There is a very important point in the interpretation of the comparative advantage
index. The Kemp-Jones model assumes that factor prices are equalized across sectors.
Under this assumption, technical progress is the only source of a reduction in labor
cost shares. We do, however, observe di¤erent wage rates across sectors in each
country, possibly due to frictions in labor mobility across sectors (within country). In
the presence of wage di¤erentials across sectors, technical progress is not necessarily
the only source of reductions in labor cost shares.
Figure 3 shows how labor market distortions could be incorporated in the labor
cost shares (and hence the comparative advantage index). Suppose that there are
no changes in technical progress in the labor-intensive good sector (¼1 = 0) and the
world interest rates (^ r = 0). These assumptions are simplifying assumptions; they
imply no changes in wage rates (^ w = 0), see equation (2.2).
3The expression in terms of natural logarithm allows us to see the di¤erent determinants of com-
parative advantage (the wage e¤ect, the productivity e¤ect, the endowment e¤ect and the technology
e¤ect) in an additive form (see section 2.3 for details).
10Figure 3 depicts the unit isoquant for the capital intensive good sector. Let 0
denote the initial choice of the capital-labor ratio. The labor cost share at this point
is µL2 = aL2w: Let us suppose that there is a cost reduction in this sector and the




L2w and is lower than µL2: Let us consider another case where there is
no cost reduction, but due to less than perfect labor mobility, production takes place
at point B (the sector-speci…c wage rate is higher than w at this point). The labor
cost share at this point is µ
B
L2 = aB
L2wB, which could again be lower than µL2: The
important point is that the labor cost shares we observe in data cannot distinguish
these two cases.
In interpreting the comparative advantage index (a measurement based on labor
cost shares), one must be aware that data on labor cost shares contain other ef-
fects (such as of wage di¤erentials across sectors) besides the e¤ects of technological
progress. The contribution of this paper is not only to compute the comparative
advantage index, but to distinguish these two determinants of labor cost shares and
thus of comparative advantage.
2.2. Comparative Advantage Index (CAI)
2.2.1. Production Technology
This section describes the speci…cation of production technology. The estimation of
production function speci…ed in this section allows us to proceed the decomposition
of the comparative advantage (or labor cost shares) in the following section.
The production technology for all countries, m = 1;:::;M; and all traded sectors,
11i = 1;:::;N; are speci…ed under the following assumptions.
(A 2.1) 14 OECD countries are assumed to have access to the same production
technology.4
This assumption allows application of the so-called meta-production functions lit-
erature, introduced by Hayami and Ruttan (1970), and fully exploited by Lau and
Yotopoulos (1989), Boskin and Lau (1992). To have access to a common technol-
ogy implies that countries have the same underlying industry-speci…c aggregate pro-
duction functions Fit(:) for each of all traded good sectors, i = 1;:::;N; but may
operate on di¤erent parts of it under di¤erent values of function parameters. The
underlying industry-speci…c aggregate production function in terms of the so-called
“e¢cient-equivalent” quantities of outputs and inputs is as follows: for m = 1;:::;M;









it are the “e¢ciency equivalent” quantities of output, capital and
labor, respectively.5 K¤
it is the “e¢ciency equivalent” level of aggregate capital in
the i th sector. This production function thus allows for the existence of external
economies of scale. The external economies of scale originated with Marshall (1890),
and were later re…ned by Edgeworth and others.
(A 2.2) The e¢ciency equivalent quantities of output and inputs are linked to
4This assumption is tested in section 3.2.
5More precisely, output Xm¤
it , should be gross output, but not value added or output originating
in industry i. Owing to the limited availability of data, however, in what follows, as in most empirical
studies of industrial production, Xm¤
it implies value added for industry i, whose quantity is deter-
mined by capital input, labor input and the level of technology. This treatment assumes constancy
of the ratio between gross output and value added, or non-substitutability between materials and
capital (or labor).
12the measured quantities of output and inputs Xm
it ;km
it ;lm
it and Kit as follows: for


















The e¢ciency equivalent quantities of output and inputs for each country are not
directly observable. In this paper, the e¢ciency equivalent quantities of output, Xm¤
it ;
and the industry’s aggregate level of capital, K¤
it; are assumed to be the same as
what are observed in data. On the other hand, the degree of e¢ciency of inputs
is represented by the initial e¢ciency level of inputs, Am
i , and the rate of technical
progress, ¸
m
i : All the parameters with superscript m and subscript i indicate that
they are country-speci…c and industry-speci…c parameters, respectively. Notice, also,
that Hicks-neutral technical progress is assumed as in section 2.2. In other words, the
rate of technical progress in labor and capital inputs are the same for each country
and each industry.
(A 2.3) The production function Fit(:) has a transcendental logarithmic (translog)
functional form.
The translog functional form was introduced by Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau
(1973). For the production function above, it takes the following form: for m =
131;:::;M; t = 1;:::;T;i = 1;:::;N;
lnXm¤
it = lnX0i + ®ki lnkm¤
it + ®li lnlm¤





















Having such a general functional form allows us to test some of the standard assump-
tions in the estimation of technological parameters: for instance, constant returns to
scale or constant elasticity of output with respect to factors.
(A 2.4) The only source of increasing returns to scale is assumed to be through
external economies of scale from the worldwide size of capital in each industry.
This assumption is equivalent to assume that …rms are in competitive markets,
perceiving that their production functions exhibit constant returns to scale.6 This
assumption implies the following conditions: for each industry i; ®ki + ®li = 1 and
¯kki + ¯kli = ¯lli + ¯kli = ¯kKi + ¯lKi = 0:
The production function in this paper is, therefore, as follows: for m = 1;:::;M;






= lnX0i + lnAm
i + ¸
m
























6To be very rigorous, this assumption must be tested, too. There are two reasons to make this
assumption. One is to reduce the number of parameters. A CRS assumption at …rm level reduces
the number of parameters to be estimated and thereby mitigates possible multicollinearity among
the data on capital, labor and time. The other reason rests on the focus of this paper. Given that the
number of parameters cannot be too large, emphases are placed on testing the presence of externality






The Comparative Advantage Index (CAI) is decomposed in two steps. The …rst step
of decomposition is very simple. The comparative advantage index, CAI
mn
ij can be
decomposed into the wage e¤ect, WE
mn









































: In other words, the
comparative advantage in relative labor costs is decomposed into relative wage and
relative labor requirement.
The second step of decomposition, decomposing the productivity e¤ect, PE
mn
ij ;
into two parts, the direct technology e¤ect, TE
mn
ij ; and the indirect endowment e¤ect,
EE
mn
ij is carried out as follows. The productivity e¤ect, PE
mn































Let us recall the production function, equation (2.10). For country m and n, the






= lnX0i + lnAm
i + ¸
m
























where m = m and n:








i , that is, ¢ln Xi

















where ¢lnAi = lnAm
i ¡lnAn





























. Two terms, ®Ki¢lnKi and ¯KKi¢lnK2
i ; drop out since both coun-
tries m and n face the same aggregate level of industry capital, Ki. The …rst two
terms of (2.13) together are called the technology e¤ect for industry i between coun-
tries m and n;TEmn
i ; and the rest are called the endowment e¤ect for industry i









i = ¢lnAi+¢¸i¢t and EEmn






Similarly, for industry j; ¢ln
Xj
lj is decomposed into the technology e¤ect for
industry j between countries m and n;TEmn
j ; and the rest as the endowment e¤ect



















The productivity e¤ect between countries m and n and sectors i and j, can,
































The interpretations of this decomposition are given in the next section.
2.2.3. Interpretation of CAI Decomposition
In the previous section, the comparative advantage index CAI
mn
ij was decomposed
in two steps. In the …rst step, CAI
mn
ij was decomposed into the wage e¤ect, WE
mn
ij ;
and the productivity e¤ect, PE
mn
ij : In the second step, the productivity e¤ect, PE
mn
ij ;
was decomposed into the technology e¤ect, TE
mn
ij and the endowment e¤ect, EE
mn
ij :
The interpretation of the …rst step of decomposition is straightforward. The pro-
ductivity e¤ect captures the e¤ect of di¤erent labor productivity on comparative
advantage. On the other hand, the wage e¤ect represents how di¤erences in relative
wage rates a¤ect the comparative advantage. If factor prices are equalized across
17sectors, then the wage e¤ect must be zero. We, however, observed that wage rates
are not necessarily equalized across sectors in any of the 14 OECD countries.
The technology e¤ect in the second step of decomposition captures the impact of
di¤erent technological progress on labor productivity, and through it on comparative
advantage. Technological progress improving labor productivity and thus reducing
the labor cost share is the movement from 0 to A in Figure 3. It is interesting to note
that the direct e¤ect is not the only source of di¤erences in labor productivity across
countries, in the presence of less than perfect labor mobility across sectors (within a
country).
The endowment e¤ect captures the e¤ect of di¤erences in the capital-labor ratio
on labor productivity and consequently on labor cost shares. The endowment e¤ect
is shown in the movement from 0 to B in Figure 3. Typically, any changes in labor




The industries and countries used in this paper are given in Tables 1 (a) and 1 (b).
The structural parameters estimated for 10 sectors are given in Table 2.
There are three points to note. First, the production function are expressed in
terms of …rst di¤erences since output data exhibits a unit root process, see Appendix






























































































Second, given the production function of equation (2.10), the output elasticity
with respect to country-speci…c capital is as follows: For all industry i and country
m;
"m





+ ¯kKi lnKi: (3.2)
Under pro…t maximization with competitive markets, the elasticity of output with
respect to capital equals the share of capital cost (or 1 minus the share of labor cost)





i ; is observed and used in the estimation of the production function. In
other words, this paper estimates a simultaneous equations system of (3.1) and (3.2),
with the parameter restrictions between the two equations for each country. Since
the 14 countries share the common parameters, ®s and ¯s, what we have here is a
28-equations system for each industry; see the Appendix for details. The instrumental
variables, which are taken from Baskin and Lau (1992), are as follows: relative price
of cotton to wheat, relative price of oil to wheat, relative price of iron to wheat, world
19population, male population, female population, arable land, permanent crops, male
life expectancy and female life expectancy.
Third, the shift parameters, or the parameters that capture di¤erences in the
e¢ciency level of inputs, lnAm
i ; could not be estimated since a constant term drops
out by …rst di¤erencing. lnAm
it is computed for each country and each industry for

































for t=1970, 1980 and 1990.
3.2. Hypothesis Testing
A couple of assumptions are tested. First, the assumption (A1) is rejected for an
alternative hypothesis that the underlying aggregate production functions are di¤erent
for countries of di¤erent size (in terms of parameters, this means that the commonly
shared parameters, ®s and ¯s, are commonly shared among countries of similar size).
This is to say that the parameters for G7 countries (USA, CAN, FRA, DEU, ITA,
JPN and GBR) and those for non-G7 countries, are estimated separately. This implies
8¸ is supposed to capture all the changes in the quality of capital and labor input and lnA the
initial e¢ciency level of capital and labor input. ¸; however, does not seem to capture all the changes





it ; tend to be large.
The shift parameter are computed, not only for the initial period, 1970, but for 1980 and 1990 as
well.
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Second, this paper tests the presence of externality and the returns from the
aggregate capital. The …rst test is to see if the economy is growing in proportion
to capital accumulation (to see if the economy resembles an AK model). This test
is equivalent to test whether the returns on the aggregate capital are the same as
the returns on labor. With the production function speci…ed in equation (2.10), the
output elasticity with respect to aggregate capital, K, is
"m





+ ¯KKi lnKi: (3.5)








This is equivalent to having the following parameter restrictions (see equations (3.2)
21and (3.5)):
®Ki = 1 ¡ ®ki; (3.6)
¯kKi = ¡¯kKi; and (3.7)
¯KKi = ¯kki: (3.8)
This assumption was not rejected for any sector in the case of G7 countries, except
for the other manufacturing products industry. In the case of non-G7 countries,
the assumption was rejected for the food products, chemical products, non-metallic
products, machineries and equipments and other manufacturing products industries.
For those rejected, no externality (or a constant returns to scale) tests are carried
out; that is to see whether the following parameter restrictions hold:
®Ki = 0; (3.9)
¯kKi = 0; and (3.10)
¯KKi = 0: (3.11)
A constant returns to scale assumption was rejected for the food products and chem-
ical products industries for non-G7 countries and the other manufacturing products
sector for G7 countries. In those cases, the parameter restriction (3.10) is only im-
posed. For the remaining cases, namely the non-metallic products, machineries and
equipments and other manufacturing products industries for non-G7 countries, the
parameter restrictions (3.9) to (3.11) are applied.
223.3. Organizational Notations for the Decomposition
The comparative advantage index, CAI
mn
ij ; is computed for all 91 combinations of
countries for each of the 45 industry combinations and for each period since the sam-
ple has 14 countries and 10 industries. Each of the comparative advantage indices
is decomposed into 5 components, the wage e¤ect, WE
mn
ij ; the productivity e¤ect,
PE
mn
ij ; the technology e¤ect, TE
mn
ij , the endowment e¤ect, EE
mn
ij and the residual
term. The number of results to present is very large, and thus some organizational
notation is necessary. In the rest of the paper, when two countries, such as Japan
and the U.S., are discussed, m represents the …rst country and n the second country.
Similarly, when two industries, such as the basic metal industry (BMI) relative to the
agricultural sector (AGR) are discussed, i represents the …rst industry (the industry
in the numerator) and j the second industry (the industry in the denominator). Each
country combination and industry combination has an index number, which is given
in Tables 1 (c) and 1 (d), respectively. For example, if one is interested in the compar-
ative advantage of the basic metal industry (BMI) relative to agriculture (AGR) in
the case of Japan with respect to the U.S., he/she should refer to country combination
index 81 and industry combination index -7.
4. Comparative Advantage between Japan and the U.S.
The comparative advantage index decomposition of this study permits an analysis
of bilateral trade relations across sectors and across time. This section discusses the
Japan-U.S. relation. It is very interesting to examine the empirical results in light
23of the structural changes in Japan and thus consequential changes in comparative
advantage over the U.S. The structural changes in Japan shifted prosperity from the
light industries to the heavy industries and can be seen as changes in comparative
advantages.
Table 3 gives a summary of the comparative advantage in each industry between
Japan and the U.S. for 1971 and 1992. The non-shaded columns are for 1971 and
the shaded columns are for 1992. The comparative advantage index (CAI) for the
machinery and equipment industry in 1971, 0:540, is the average of the CAI for the
machinery and equipment sector relative to all other 9 sectors, i.e., the average of CAI
for the industry combination index -8, -16, -23, -29, -34, -38, -41, -43 and 45 of Table
1 (d). The positive sign implies that Japan, in fact, had a comparative dis-advantage
over the U.S. in the machinery industry relative to other industries on average in
1971. To indicate the comparative advantage in Japan, all the numbers with negative
signs are bolded in Table 3. The magnitude is in natural logarithm; therefore, 0:540
implies that the relative labor cost in Japan was approximately 1:71 times higher that
in the U.S.
4.1. Structural Changes and the Comparative Advantage Reversal
The comparative advantage reversal between the two countries started in the textile
industry in the 1950s and 1960s. The Japanese textile and basic metal industries,
in particular, steel, became competitive and started enjoying comparative advantage
over the U.S. in the 1960s. This phenomenon can be seen from the negative signs of
the CAI in 1971 for both the textile industry, ¡0:128; and the basic metal industry,
24¡0:146. The magnitude implies that the relative cost of production in Japan was
12 and 14 percent lower than those in the U.S., respectively. On the other hand,
machine tools, autos, videos, semiconductors, and other products belonging to the
machinery industry, MEQ, were still at a comparative “dis”advantage in the early
1970s. The CAI in the machinery industry in 1971, 0:540; indicates that the relative
cost of production in Japan was higher (approximately 1.71 times) than that in the
U.S.
There was a large structural change and thus a large shift in comparative advan-
tages in international trade as industrialization in Japan continued during the 1970s
and 1980s. Light industries, such as the food industry, FOD and textile industry,
TEX, lost their comparative advantages by 1992. This can be seen from the positive
signs of the CAI for FOD and TEX, 0:072 and 0:290, respectively (the relative cost
of production in the food and textile industries in Japan was approximately 1:07 and
1:34 times higher those in the U.S., respectively). On the other hand, the comparative
“dis”advantage in the machinery and equipment industry, MEQ, turned to compara-
tive advantage by 1992. The negative value, ¡0:135; indicates that the relative cost
of production in Japan was 0:87 times lower that in the U.S. 9
9Gagnon and Rose (1991) looked at trade ‡ows between the U.S. and Japan for 1962-1988 in the
4-digit SITC classi…cation and found very little evidence of product-cycle dynamics. In other words,
goods that were in surplus (de…cit) in 1962 tended to remain in surplus (de…cit) in the late 1980s.
The analysis of the comparative advantage in a unit labor cost in this paper is not a explicit analysis
of trade ‡ows and thus has not taken the demand side factors as the determinants of international
trade. The contradiction between their …ndings and mine must be, therefore, examined carefully in
a demand side analysis, which is the topic of Saito (1999).
254.2. Source of Comparative Advantages
We now turn to the source of comparative advantages. Japan’s comparative “dis-
”advantage over the U.S. in the machinery industry in 1971 was mainly due to the
productivity e¤ect, 0:734. The relative labor requirement in Japan was more than
twice that in the U.S. In fact, with regards to the wage e¤ect, Japan had a compara-
tive advantage over the U.S. in 1971. ¡0:194 implies that the relative wage in Japan
was approximately 0:82 times lower that in the U.S.
More interestingly, the productivity e¤ect decomposition indicates that the com-
parative “dis”advantage in productivity was mainly due to the e¤ect of relative tech-
nology, 0:810; and not that of capital-labor ratio, ¡0:149. This is to say that, keeping
the capital-labor ratio the same, the relative labor requirement in the machinery in-
dustry in Japan was as high as 2:25 times that of the U.S. due to the less-advanced
Japanese technology. On the other hand, keeping technologies the same, di¤erences
in the capital-labor ratio in the machinery industry (with respect to the rest of the
industries in each country) brought about comparative advantage in Japan. The rela-
tively higher use of capital to the machinery industry is consistent with the industrial
policies of the Japanese Government in the 1970s and before it (Komiya, 1990 and
Komiya and Irino, 1992).
By 1992, the technology e¤ect had turned to a negative sign, ¡0:130; while the
endowment e¤ect had become positive, 0:030: This implies that the relative technology
in the machinery industry became more competitive, while the relative endowment
e¤ect less competitive. The comparative advantage in the technology e¤ect exceeded
26the comparative “dis”advantage in the endowment e¤ect to bring about a comparative
advantage in productivity e¤ect.
The structural changes in Japan in the 1970s and 1980s seem to be well-re‡ected
in the reversal of the comparative advantage index from positive to negative in the
heavy industries and from negative to positive in the light industries.
5. U.S. Competitiveness: By Sector
This section shows how a country’s trade competitiveness can be analyzed using the
comparative advantage index decomposition. U.S. competitiveness in 1971 and 1992
is presented in this section. The key features of U.S. competitiveness in the 1980s
were threefold.
First, the U.S. saw a substantial improvement in comparative advantage in food,
textiles, chemical products, and other manufacturing products, but some decline in
mining and the basic metal industry (other sectors remained unchanged). It is a well-
discussed issue that U.S. labor productivity in the 1990s has improved substantially,
but it was also the case in some industries prior to the 1990s. The key determinant
in explaining these changes is the productivity (or labor requirement) e¤ect and not
the wage e¤ect.
Second, the productivity e¤ect in the U.S. was predominantly determined by the
technology e¤ect. In other words, the change in the comparative advantage in relative
technology was a key factor.
Third, the wage e¤ect remained unchanged over the period:10 it remained strong
10The average wage across countries may have been converging as stated in Madsen (1996), who
27in the agriculture and textile industries (i.e., the relative wage in these sectors was low
in comparison with other countries) and remained weak in the chemical products and
machinery and equipment industries (i.e., the relative wage in these sectors remained
high in comparison with other countries). This steady nature of relative wages may
be due to the fact that wages are not necessarily changing according to changes
in labor productivity, but are largely …xed by other factors. For instance, wages
are typically determined by skills required in each sector (which are captured by
education, experience and abilities). This may not necessarily re‡ect changes in labor
productivity.
The details of these …ndings can be found in Table 4, which consists of 10 sub-
tables. The …rst sub-table presents U.S. competitiveness in agriculture in 1971 and
1992. The non-shaded columns present the 1971 result and the shaded columns
present the 1992 result. The ninth row is U.S. competitiveness over Japan in agri-
culture in 1971 and is identical to the …rst row of Table 3. In other words, the
comparative advantage index (CAI) for the ninth row of this sub-table, ¡0:014, is
the average of the CAI for the agriculture sector relative to all other 9 sectors for the
country combination of JPN-USA; that is, the average of the CAI for the industry
combination index 1 to 9 of Table 1 (c) and for the country combination index 81
of Table 1 (d). In Table 4, a positive sign (in bold) indicates that the U.S. had a
comparative advantage over the country in comparison. The following sections 5.1 to
5.10 present a summary of …ndings for each industry. They correspond to sub-tables
looked at 21 OECD countries for the period of 1960 to 1993. The wage e¤ect remained unchanged,
however, implying that the wage di¤erential across sectors was not converging.
28of Table 4.
5.1. Agriculture
The U.S. agricultural industry remained reasonably competitive during the period of
1971-92; it had a comparative advantage over 6 out of 14 countries, Canada, West
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the U.K., in 1971, and over 7 countries,
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and the U.K., in 1992.
It is very interesting to note that the key driving force of the strong U.S. agri-
cultural industry was the relative wage component. The comparative advantage in
the wage e¤ect was over 9 countries in 1971, and over 12 countries in 1992. This
may be due to the fact that most countries tend to have some kind of protection in
agriculture. This could be driving the relative wage of agriculture in these countries
higher than that in the U.S.
It is also interesting to note that the comparative advantage in the productivity
(or labor requirement) e¤ect was mainly driven by the technology e¤ect. In terms of
technology, the U.S. had a comparative advantage over only 3 countries in 1971, but
over 7 countries in 1992.
5.2. Mining
The U.S. mining sector was strongly competitive in 1971, but seemed to have fallen
slightly in 1992; it had a comparative advantage over 10 out of 12 countries in 1971,
but only 6 countries in 1992. The key player in both periods was the productivity
e¤ect and not the wage e¤ect as in the case of agriculture.
29The cause of the fall in productivity (or labor requirement) e¤ect was in both the
direct technology e¤ect and the endowment e¤ect.
5.3. Food
The U.S. food industry gained a comparative advantage substantially between 1971
and 1992. It had a comparative advantage over only 1 country in 1971, but over 7
countries in 1992. This improvement was driven mainly by the productivity e¤ect. It
is interesting to note that productivity enhancements to recover U.S. competitiveness
in international trade (which is believed to have brought prosperity in recent years to
the U.S. economy) were already taking place in the late 1980s (Hickman, 1992).
As in the case of other industries, the technology e¤ect was an important com-
ponent of the comparative advantage in productivity. The U.S. food industry had
a comparative advantage in relative technology over 3 countries in 1971, but over 7
countries in 1992.
5.4. Textile
U.S. competitiveness in the textile industry also improved substantially during the
period of 1971-92. The U.S. textile industry had a comparative “dis”advantage over
all countries in 1971, but a comparative advantage over 7 out of 12 countries by 1992.
The wage e¤ect during this period remained unchanged and strong in both peri-
ods; the comparative advantage in the wage e¤ect was over 8 out of 12 countries in
both 1971 and 1992. What induced the substantial improvement in the 1980s was,
therefore, improvements in productivity.
30As in the case of the food industry, the improvement in the productivity e¤ect
was due to an improvement in relative technology.
5.5. Paper
U.S. competitiveness in the paper industry did not change much over the period
1971-92.
5.6. Chemical Products
As in the case of the food and textile industries, the chemical industry also saw
a substantial improvement in competitiveness; the comparative advantage was over
only 3 out of 12 countries in 1971, but was over 8 countries in 1992.
The wage e¤ect remained rather moderate; the comparative advantage was over 4
countries in 1971 and 3 in 1992. The main source of the stronger competitiveness was,
therefore, due to improvement in relative productivity. The comparative advantage
in relative productivity was over 6 countries in 1971 and 9 in 1992.
The key player in the productivity e¤ect was the endowment e¤ect. In other
words, the e¤ective endowment of labor inputs with machineries played an important
role. The US chemical industry had a comparative advantage over 8 countries in both
1971 and 1992. The technology e¤ect comparison, however, showed that the U.S. had
a comparative advantage over 7 countries in 1971 and 6 in 1992.
315.7. Non-Metallic Products
The U.S. non-metallic products industry was not competitive in either period, 1971 or
1992; the comparative “dis”advantage was over all countries except Belgium in 1971,
and over all countries in 1992.
The key determinant of the comparative advantage in this industry was again the
productivity e¤ect, which hampered the comparative advantage.
5.8. Basic Metal
The U.S. basic metal industry was very strong in 1971, but had lost its competitiveness
by 1992. The comparative advantage was over 10 out of 12 countries in 1971 but over
only 6 countries in 1992.
The main source of the loss in competitiveness was again in the productivity e¤ect.
The comparative advantage in terms of the productivity (or labor requirement) e¤ect
fell from over 8 countries to 5 countries during this period.
The fall in the productivity e¤ect was mainly caused by a fall in the technology
e¤ect. The U.S. basic metal industry had a comparative advantage in the technology
e¤ect over 9 countries in 1971, but only over 4 countries in 1992. This seems to
be in contrast with the rest of the industries, most of which were improving relative
technology. This might be due to the fact that other countries, such as West Germany,
Italy and Japan, had improved their relative productivity to a greater extent than
the improvement in the U.S.
325.9. Machinery and Equipment
The comparative advantage in this industry did not change much between 1971 and
1992; the comparative advantage was over 4 countries in both periods. The U.S. had
a rather strong position in productivity in both periods: the comparative advantage
was over 6 countries in 1971 and 7 in 1992.
The wage e¤ect, however, seemed to have hampered the overall competitiveness:
the comparative “dis”advantage in the wage e¤ect in 1971 and 1992 was over 11
countries and 10 countries, respectively). This is quite the opposite of what was
observed in the agriculture or food industries, where the wage e¤ect was favorable.
5.10. Other Manufacturing Products
U.S. competitiveness in other manufacturing products improved over the period of
1971-92. The stronger competitiveness in the U.S., particularly driven by a compar-
ative advantage in technology, was probably in medical machinery and equipment,
which was a rapidly growing product in this industry.
Here, too, the technology e¤ect played an important role in improving the pro-
ductivity e¤ect. The comparative advantage in the technology e¤ect improved from
being over 4 countries to being over 9 countries between 1971 and 1992.
6. Comments on Other Trade Theories
The comparative advantage index decomposition provides fruitful insight for the Ri-
cardian theory of trade and the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin theorem with no capital
33mobility. First, the Ricardian model claims that the relative labor requirements are
the key determinant of comparative advantage. The empirical evidence could only
con…rm this claim for the 1970s. In the 1980s, the sector-speci…c wage rates (rela-
tive to those in other sectors in a country) began to play a much more important
role as the determinant of comparative advantage of each country. Second, one of
the main sources of the poor performance of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem is widely
agreed to be in cross-country di¤erences in relative labor requirements. The decom-
position of relative labor requirements into two sub-components indicates that such
di¤erences are highly correlated with (i) cross-country di¤erences in relative rates
of technical progress in light industries and (ii) cross-country di¤erences in relative
capital requirements in heavy industries.
6.1. Ricardian Theory of Trade
The Ricardian theory of trade explains comparative advantage simply by relative
labor productivity. This study …nds strong evidence to support the Ricardian theory
of trade in 1971, as in the case of MacDougall et al. (1962), Stern (1962) and Balassa
(1963).11 In contrast to their studies, which only looked at the UK-US data, this
paper found a high correlation between the comparative advantage index (CAI) and
the productivity e¤ect for all OECD countries for all industries.12 This evidence
changes during the sample period, however. The correlation between the comparative
11See Deardor¤ (1984) for more details.
12Here, CAI is implicitly assumed to re‡ect the patterns of trade fully. This is probably not
the case. Factors such as di¤erent preferences (e.g., home good bias) and transaction costs (e.g.,
transportation costs) are likely to be causing a lot of noise between the patterns of comparative
advantage and the actual pattern of trade. This is discussed in Saito (1999).
34advantage index and the productivity e¤ect fell substantially in some sectors, such as
non-metallic products, basic metal products and machinery and equipment industries.
Table 5 presents the correlation coe¢cients between the comparative advantage
index (CAI) and each of the four components of the decomposition for 1971 and 1992
for each industry. An asterisk next to a correlation coe¢cient indicates that it is
statistically signi…cant at the 5 percent level. For instance, the correlation coe¢cient
between the CAI and the productivity e¤ect for 1971 in agriculture, 0:930; is computed
from the sample of all 91 country combinations (e.g., Japan vs. the U.S., can be found
in the …rst row of Table 3, ¡0:014 (CAI) and ¡0:608 (the productivity e¤ect)).
In 1971 (see the non-shaded columns of Table 5), the CAI and the productivity
e¤ect have a high correlation in all industries, ranging from 0:834 and 0:982. This
implies that the size and sign of the CAI are predominantly determined by the pro-
ductivity e¤ect. It is to be noted that the correlation coe¢cient represents simply the
general tendency (or the summary of numerous observations), while individual …gures
for each industry and for each combination of countries stand for individual facts.
It is important to note, however, that the high correlation is not necessarily the
case in 1992. The shaded area of Table 5 presents the relationship between the CAI
and its components in 1992. It must be stressed that, in contrast to 1971, the strong
relationship between the CAI and the productivity e¤ect was no longer the case,
particularly in TEX (0:640), CHE (0:686), MNM (0:252), BMI (0:297) and MEQ
(0:245). On the other hand, the relationship between the CAI and the wage e¤ect
increased, particularly in those that lost the strong relationship between the CAI and
the productivity e¤ect, TEX (0:776), MNM (0:902), BMI (0:564) and MEQ (0:585).
35These …ndings lead us to believe that competition in relative labor cost shares,
which was de…nitely competition over relative productivity (or a labor requirement)
in 1971, was moving toward competition over relative wage rates. In other words,
keeping wage rates low relative to the rest of the economy in each country became
much more important issue than reducing the costs through technical progress. This
may be a result of convergence of di¤erences in labor productivity across countries,
particularly in heavy industries.
6.2. Poor Performance of Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem
The poor performance of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem in data is a well discussed
issue, since Leontief (1953), Leamer (1980), Bowen et al. (1987) and others. There
are two standard explanations of the poor performance of the theorem. They are, the
di¤erences in production technologies and factor prices across countries.
Firstly, relaxing the assumption of “universal technology” has been questioned
and discussed thoroughly by various people in the empirical H-O literature; see Tre-
‡er (1995), Maskus and Webster (1995), Harrigan (1997), and others. This literature
tends to assume that di¤erences in factor requirements are due to di¤erences in tech-
nologies. This is equivalent to assume that factor prices are equalized and hence there
is neither endowment e¤ect nor wage e¤ect.
Secondly, relaxing the assumption of factor price equalization across sectors and
across countries has also been explored; see Davis et al. (1997) and others. Davis
et al. assume that factor prices are equalized and technologies are the same within
a country, but not across countries. Using a regional data on Japan, they show that
36the H-O theorem holds well for the regional data. They, in contrast to Tre‡er (1995)
and others, assume that there is no di¤erences in technology when factor prices are
equalized.
The evidence in this paper shows that these two explanations have di¤erent im-
portance in di¤erent industries.
Table 6 presents the correlation coe¢cients between the productivity e¤ect and
its two components, the endowment e¤ect and the technology e¤ect, for 1971 and
1992. Again, the non-shaded area is for 1971 and the shaded area is for 1992. There
are two important points to note. First, it is clear that in both periods the light
industries, such as the food (FOD) and textile (TEX) industries show very little
correlation between the productivity e¤ect and the endowment e¤ect, but very high
correlation between the productivity e¤ect and the technology e¤ect. For instance,
for the food industry (FOD), the correlation with the endowment e¤ect in 1971 and
1992 is 0:022 and 0:295, respectively, while that with the technology e¤ect is 0:774
and 0:797, respectively. This indicates that the labor requirement in light industries
is predominantly determined by the technology e¤ect in these industries (or we could
also say that the endowment e¤ect is not large enough to reverse the comparative
advantage).
The second point relates to the heavy industries, which are in great contrast to
the light industries. In the case of heavy industries, such as the chemical prod-
ucts (CHE), non-metallic products (MNM), basic metal (BMI) and machinery and
equipments (MEQ) industries, the correlation between the productivity e¤ect and the
endowment e¤ect tended to go up from 1971 to 1992, while that with the technol-
37ogy e¤ect tended to go down. For instance, in the case of the non-metallic products
industry (MNM), the correlation with the endowment e¤ect went up from 0:434 to
0:749, while that with the technology e¤ect went down from 0:882 to 0:628: These
…ndings indicate that in the heavy industries, particularly in early 1990s, the labor
productivity (and consequently the comparative advantage) is closely related to the
choice of the capital-labor ratio, rather than the rate of technical progress. The im-
portance of the choice of capital-labor ratio may re‡ect the importance of factors
that are outside the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin models, for instance the degree of
market power and price setting behavior associated with increasing-returns-to-scale
production technology.
7. Conclusion
Under the assumption of di¤erences in technologies and perfect capital mobility, this
paper has examined the determinants of the comparative advantage in international
trade, using every combination of 14 OECD countries and 10 traded industries for
1970-92. The main …ndings as follows.
First, the comparative advantage between Japan and U.S. was examined. The
changes in the industrial structure in Japan during the 1970s and the 1980s were
well-re‡ected in the shift of comparative advantage from light to heavy industries.
Second, the comparative advantage of the U.S. with respect to the rest of the world
for each industry was discussed. Improvement in labor productivity was evident,
particularly in the food, textile, chemical products and other manufacturing products
industries. The main factor in explaining the changes in labor productivity was
38improvement in technology.
Third, the Ricardian model focused on the relative labor requirement (or the
relative labor productivity). The empirical …ndings showed that this approach would
undermine the relatively large impact of less than perfect labor mobility (and hence
wage rate di¤erentials) across sectors within a country, particularly in early 1990s.
Finally, this study indicated that di¤erences in relative labor productivity was
closely related to (i) di¤erences in relative rate of technical progress in light industries
and (ii) di¤erences in relative capital-labor ratio in heavy industries.
398. Appendix
8.1. Estimation Method: 3SLS
For each industry, I simultaneously estimate the system of equations of (15) and the
elasticity equation (16) for all 14 OECD countries, using time series data for 1970-
1992. The 28-equation system is as follows (industry subscripts are dropped here):
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The instrumental variables are taken from Baskin and Lau (1992).
8.2. Data
The industry-level output, Xm
it , capital, km
it ; labor, lm





it ; and in-
dustry aggregate capital stock, Kit; for each industry i; country, m, and time, t; are
directly taken or computed from International Sectoral Data Base 97. The variables
used are as follows:
GDPDm
it : Value added at market prices, at 1990 prices and 1990 PPPs (US$);
KTV Dm
it : Gross capital stock, at 1990 prices and 1990 PPPs (US$);
40EEm
it : Number of employees;
WSSSm
it :Compensation of employees, at current prices, national currency;
GDPm
it : Value added at market prices, current prices, national currency.
The variables in this paper, Xm
it ;km
it and lm
























8.3. Test for a Unit Root
The unit root test in this paper follows Dickey and Fuller (1981) closely. The model
used is
yt = ¹ + ¯t + °yt¡1 + Á(yt¡1 ¡ yt¡2) + "t;
where yt is real GDP for the U.S. The test is carried out by testing the joint hypothesis
that both ¯ and °¤ are zero in the model
(yt ¡ yt¡1) = ¹ + ¯t + °¤yt¡1 + Á(yt¡1 ¡ yt¡2) + "t:
The results for the U.S. data show that in all 10 traded good sectors, except for
PAP, a unit root hypothesis cannot be rejected.
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451.AGR agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 1.AUS Australia
2.MID mining and quarrying 2.BEL Belgium
3.FOD manufacturing of food, beverages and tobacco 3.CAN Canada
4.TEX textiles, wearing apparel and leather industries 4.DNK Denmark
5.PAP manufacturing of paper, paper products, 5.FRA France
 printing and publishing 6.FIN Finland
6.CHE manufacturing of chemicals and of chemical  7.DEU West Germany
petroleum, coal, rubber and plastic rubber 8.ITA Italy
7.MNM manufacturing of non-metallic products,  9.JPN Japan
except products of petroleum and coal 10.NLD Netherland
8.BMI basic metal industries 11.NOR Norway
9.MEQ manufacturing of fabricated metal products,  12.SWE Sweden
machinery and equipment 13.GBR United Kingdom
10.MOT other manufacturing industries 14.USA United States
m\n 1.AUS 2.BEL 3.CAN 4.DNK 5.FRA 6.FIN 7.DEU 8.ITA 9.JPN 10.NLD 11.NOR 12.SWE 13.GBR 14.USA
1.AUS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
2.BEL 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
3.CAN 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36
4.DNK 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46
5.FRA 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55
6.FIN 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63
7.DEU 64 65 66 67 68 69 70
8.ITA 71 72 73 74 75 76
9.JPN 77 78 79 80 81
10.NLD 82 83 84 85
11.NOR   86 87 88
12.SWE    89 90
13.GBR    91
14.USA   
i \ j  1.AGR 2.MID 3.FOD 4.TEX 5.PAP 6.CHE 7.MNM 8.BMI 9.MEQ 10.MOT   
1.AGR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2.MID -1 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
3.FOD -2 -10 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
4.TEX -3 -11 -18 25 26 27 28 29 30
5.PAP -4 -12 -19 -25 31 32 33 34 35
6.CHE -5 -13 -20 -26 -31 36 37 38 39
7.MNM -6 -14 -21 -27 -32 -36 40 41 42
8.BMI -7 -15 -22 -28 -33 -37 -40 43 44
9.MEQ -8 -16 -23 -29 -34 -38 -41 -43 45
10.MOT -9 -17 -24 -30 -35 -39 -42 -44 -45
Table 1 (c): Country Combination Index
Table 1 (d): Industry Combination Index
Table 1 (b): Countries Table 1 (a): Industries1.AGR  2.MID  3.FOD 4.TEX  5.PAP 6.CHE  7.MNM   8.BMI  9.MEQ  10.MOT
14.USA 0.037 * -0.015 0.005 0.061 * -0.022 * 0.008 -0.024 * -0.021 -0.019 * -0.057 *
1.AUS -0.010 0.008
2.BEL 0.000 -0.002 0.019 0.013 0.126 * 0.028 * 0.016 0.027 * 0.054 *
3.CAN 0.024 -0.125 * -0.008 0.095 * -0.034 * 0.001 -0.025 -0.015 -0.018 -0.054 *
4.DNK 0.006 0.022 0.008 -0.004 0.069 * -0.005 -0.014 0.002 -0.056 *
5.FRA -0.009 -0.021 -0.005 -0.040 * -0.025 * -0.008 0.024 * -0.001 -0.013 *
6.FIN -0.008 0.010 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.052 * 0.007 -0.049 * 0.022 * -0.002
7.DEU 0.004 -0.049 * -0.005 0.030 * -0.011 -0.014 -0.014 0.009 -0.018 * -0.045 *
8.ITA -0.022 -0.002 0.023 * 0.035 * 0.000 -0.016 -0.013 -0.007
9.JPN -0.057 * -0.041 * -0.036 * -0.011 -0.025 -0.027 0.024 -0.025 0.005 -0.072 *
10.NLD 0.002 -0.024
11.NOR -0.026 -0.023 0.009 -0.004 0.052 * -0.022 0.005
12.SWE -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 0.007 0.003 0.062 * 0.010 -0.021 0.015 * 0.111 *
13.GBR 0.015 -0.007 0.008 -0.027 * -0.003 0.009 0.012 0.020 -0.004 -0.008
Alfak (*1) G7 0.530 * 2.324 * 0.085 0.393 * -2.436 * 1.068 * -0.309 * 0.038 -1.494 * 0.115 *
non G7 1.532 * 3.643 * 0.296 * 0.128 -1.578 * 0.993 * 1.602 * 6.588 * 0.464 * -1.800 *
AlfaK G7 0.470 * -1.324 * 0.915 * 0.607 * 3.436 * -0.068 1.309 * 0.962 * 2.494 * 0.885 *
non G7 -0.532 * -2.643 * 0.704 * 0.872 * 2.578 * 0.007 . -5.588 * . .
Betakk G7 -0.017 * 0.101 * -0.004 0.010 * -0.181 * 0.041 * -0.037 * -0.013 -0.102 * 0.025 *
non G7 0.052 * 0.205 * 0.000 -0.002 -0.144 * -0.049 * -0.125 * 0.411 * -0.025 * 0.199 *
BetaKK G7 -0.017 * 0.101 * -0.033 0.010 * -0.181 * 0.041 * -0.037 * -0.013 -0.102 * 0.025 *
non G7 0.052 * 0.205 * -0.017 -0.002 -0.144 * -0.049 * . 0.411 * . .
BetakK G7 0.017 * -0.108 * 0.016 -0.010 * 0.181 * -0.041 * 0.037 * 0.013 0.102 * .
non G7 -0.052 * -0.205 * . 0.002 0.134 * . . -0.411 * . .
14.USA -6.781 9.990 -7.369 -11.503 -31.590 -4.783 -15.907 -13.879 -27.692 -22.898
1.AUS -6.888 9.803 . . . . . . . .
2.BEL 1.151 . -5.482 -14.333 -20.511 18.585 -0.166 35.755 6.476 17.899
3.CAN -6.871 9.845 -7.228 -11.519 -31.885 -5.228 -15.569 -14.203 -27.976 -23.131
4.DNK -0.189 . -6.248 -14.417 -20.433 19.384 0.211 35.360 6.387 18.133
5.FRA -6.166 10.692 -7.515 -11.183 -31.700 -4.874 -16.042 -14.551 -27.970 .
6.FIN 0.544 14.550 -5.929 -14.493 -20.989 19.523 -0.097 35.586 6.152 17.816
7.DEU -7.389 9.876 -7.433 -11.421 -32.037 -4.691 -16.026 -14.489 -27.873 -22.915
8.ITA -6.691 . -7.521 -11.349 . -5.934 -16.360 -14.159 -28.220 -24.440
9.JPN -6.088 9.820 -6.984 -11.767 -32.428 -4.406 -15.946 -14.096 -28.552 -22.814
10.NLD 0.866 19.861 . . . . . . . .
11.NOR 0.438 . -5.654 -14.403 -20.580 19.188 . 35.430 6.584 .
12.SWE 0.638 18.307 -5.520 -14.171 -20.777 19.748 0.076 35.471 6.370 16.196
13.GBR -6.650 9.384 -7.700 -11.526 -31.825 -5.159 -15.946 -13.980 -28.333 -23.343
* The estimate is significant at the 5 percent level.
(*1) Lamda for each country, alfak, alfaK, betakk, betaKK and betakK, are estimated for G7 and non G7 countries separately.







Table 2: Structural Parameters
IndustryIndustry
1971 1992 1971 1992 1971 1992 1971 1992 1971 1992
1. AGR -0.014 0.066 0.594 0.091 -0.608 -0.025 0.161 -0.586 -0.785 0.590
2. MID 1.523 0.439 -0.046 -0.380 1.570 0.819 1.534 1.201 0.099 -0.352
3. FOD -0.660 0.072 -0.306 -0.085 -0.355 0.157 0.136 0.272 -0.500 0.036
4. TEX -0.128 0.290 0.037 -0.143 -0.165 0.432 -0.405 -0.187 0.255 0.655
5. PAP 0.173 -0.096 -0.191 -0.015 0.364 -0.081 -0.439 -0.334 0.815 0.172
6. CHE -0.684 -0.467 0.216 0.371 -0.900 -0.838 -0.315 -0.298 -0.498 -0.380
7. MNM -0.464 -0.033 -0.203 0.095 -0.261 -0.128 -0.172 -0.106 -0.129 -0.216
8. BMI -0.146 -0.433 0.072 0.105 -0.218 -0.537 -0.332 -0.098 0.126 -0.550
9. MEQ 0.540 -0.135 -0.194 -0.091 0.734 -0.044 -0.149 0.030 0.810 -0.130
10. MOT -0.141 0.298 0.020 0.051 -0.161 0.246 -0.020 0.106 -0.194 0.175
 The observation for 1971.
 The observation for 1992.
Bold   Japan has a comparative advantage over the U.S.
Industry
1971 1992 1971 1992 1971 1992 1971 1992
1. AGR 0.019 0.178 0.930 * 0.928 * 0.496 * 0.721 * 0.686 * 0.657 *
2. MID 0.010 -0.516 * 0.982 * 0.973 * 0.457 * 0.832 * 0.696 * 0.618 *
3. FOD 0.619 * 0.897 * 0.837 * 0.870 * -0.277 * 0.086 0.821 * 0.851 *
4. TEX -0.197 0.776 * 0.934 * 0.640 * 0.426 * -0.109 0.719 * 0.606 *
5. PAP -0.288 * 0.302 * 0.905 * 0.927 * 0.015 0.759 * 0.563 * -0.478
6. CHE 0.171 0.294 * 0.942 * 0.686 * 0.503 * 0.786 * 0.886 * 0.105
7. MNM -0.146 0.902 * 0.834 * 0.252 0.161 -0.300 * 0.831 * 0.660 *
8. BMI -0.309 * 0.564 * 0.935 * 0.297 * 0.142 0.502 * 0.868 * -0.108
9. MEQ -0.055 0.585 * 0.882 * 0.245 * 0.085 0.471 * 0.739 * -0.197
10. MOT -0.420 * -0.350 * 0.922 * 0.907 * 0.463 * 0.213 0.519 * 0.732 *
*  The correlation coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level.
Industry
1971 1992 1971 1992 1971 1992
1. AGR 0.630 * 0.764 * 0.682 * 0.695 * 0.419 * -0.036
2. MID 0.508 * 0.886 * 0.685 * 0.550 * 0.564 * -0.267
3. FOD 0.022 0.295 * 0.774 * 0.797 * 0.313 * -0.296 *
4. TEX 0.433 * 0.319 * 0.837 * 0.742 * 0.644 * -0.001
5. PAP -0.098 0.790 * 0.717 * -0.424 * -0.428 * 0.698 *
6. CHE 0.560 * 0.662 * 0.961 * 0.645 * 0.479 * 0.790 *
7. MNM 0.434 * 0.749 * 0.882 * 0.628 * 0.117 -0.503 *
8. BMI 0.281 * 0.439 * 0.916 * 0.675 * 0.131 -0.148
9. MEQ 0.029 0.568 * 0.917 * 0.774 * 0.270 * 0.013
10. MOT 0.543 * 0.570 * 0.555 * 0.445 * 0.787 * 0.497 *
*  The correlation coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level.
Endowment Effect Technology Effect Residuals
Technology Effect Wage Effect Productivity Effect Endowment Effect
Table 3: Japan vs. the U.S. (1971, 1992)
Table 6: PE and Its Components (1971, 1992)
Table 5: CAI and Its Components (1971, 1992)
Endowment Effect Technology Effect Productivity Effect Comparative  Wage EffectCountry 
Comb
Index 1971 1992 1971 1992 1971 1992 1971 1992 1971 1992
13. AUS -0.434 0.053 -0.073 0.013 -0.361 0.040 -0.257 -0.242 -0.011 0.400
25. BEL -1.322 -1.213 0.648 0.230 -1.970 -1.443 -0.700 -0.801 -1.147 -0.442
36.CAN 0.121 0.405 0.161 0.105 -0.040 0.300 0.058 0.231 -0.048 -0.048
46. DNK -0.194 0.080 0.309 0.339 -0.503 -0.259 -0.285 -0.645 0.191 0.088
55. FRA -0.379 -0.468 -0.135 0.355 -0.244 -0.824 0.455 -0.341 -0.628 -0.440
63. FIN -0.312 -0.231 0.550 0.371 -0.861 -0.602 -0.003 -0.630 -0.729 -0.101
70. DEU 0.167 -0.375 0.488 0.182 -0.321 -0.557 -0.670 -0.935 0.484 0.431
76. ITA 0.247 1.029 -0.123 0.585 0.370 0.444 1.022 0.020 -0.586 0.503
81. JPN -0.014 0.066 0.594 0.091 -0.608 -0.025 0.161 -0.586 -0.785 0.590
85. NLD 1.022 1.132 0.449 0.129 0.573 1.003 0.042 0.287 0.486 0.673
88. NOR -0.918 -0.710 -0.163 -0.385 -0.755 -0.325 -0.121 -0.558 -0.493 0.041
90. SWE 0.285 -0.142 0.510 0.335 -0.225 -0.477 0.624 -0.373 -0.758 -0.242
91. GBR 0.448 0.218 0.214 0.125 0.234 0.093 0.730 0.411 -0.410 -0.217
Country 
Comb
Index 1971 1992 1971 1992 1971 1992 1971 1992 1971 1992
13. AUS 0.434 -0.053 0.073 -0.013 0.361 -0.040 0.257 0.242 0.011 -0.400
25. BEL . . . . . . . . . .
36.CAN 0.243 0.047 -0.016 -0.066 0.259 0.113 0.226 -0.076 0.120 0.486
46. DNK 2.910 -1.465 -0.001 0.058 2.912 -1.523 0.503 -0.571 . .
55. FRA 1.344 0.757 -0.243 -0.356 1.587 1.114 2.291 1.808 -0.771 -0.458
63. FIN 1.801 0.482 -0.177 -0.222 1.979 0.704 1.018 0.735 0.746 -0.102
70. DEU 1.334 1.380 0.073 0.038 1.261 1.343 1.296 1.056 -0.063 0.455
76. ITA . . . . . . . . . .
81. JPN 1.523 0.439 -0.046 -0.380 1.570 0.819 1.534 1.201 0.099 -0.352
85. NLD -1.022 -1.132 -0.449 -0.129 -0.573 -1.003 -0.042 -0.287 -0.486 -0.673
88. NOR 1.354 -1.140 0.121 0.604 1.233 -1.744 0.905 -0.820 . .
90. SWE 0.525 0.500 -0.084 -0.124 0.609 0.625 0.898 0.816 -0.179 -0.151
91. GBR 1.217 -0.043 -0.275 -0.006 1.492 -0.037 1.178 0.171 0.375 -0.130
Country 
Comb
Index 1971 1992 1971 1992 1971 1992 1971 1992 1971 1992
13. AUS . . . . . . . . . .
25. BEL -0.258 0.129 -0.156 -0.041 -0.102 0.170 0.154 0.181 -0.257 0.141
36.CAN -0.252 -0.079 -0.084 0.010 -0.168 -0.089 0.103 0.183 -0.304 -0.161
46. DNK 0.165 0.173 0.038 0.021 0.127 0.152 -0.141 0.130 0.467 0.101
55. FRA -0.224 0.097 0.104 0.066 -0.327 0.031 -0.484 -0.230 0.188 0.329
63. FIN -0.242 0.184 -0.093 0.071 -0.149 0.113 -0.133 0.000 0.027 0.273
70. DEU -0.417 -0.251 -0.115 -0.179 -0.302 -0.072 -0.167 0.062 -0.144 -0.106
76. ITA -0.190 -1.078 0.078 -0.787 -0.268 -0.291 0.085 0.145 -0.368 -0.294
81. JPN -0.660 0.072 -0.306 -0.085 -0.355 0.157 0.136 0.272 -0.500 0.036
85. NLD . . . . . . . . . .
88. NOR -0.205 0.620 0.081 0.055 -0.286 0.565 -0.203 0.225 -0.138 0.384
90. SWE -0.540 -0.198 -0.074 0.022 -0.465 -0.219 -0.169 -0.033 -0.320 -0.023
91. GBR -0.213 0.056 -0.178 -0.037 -0.035 0.093 -0.143 0.041 0.076 0.182
Table 4: U.S. Competitiveness: ARG (1971, 1992)
Comparative Advantage 
Index
Wage Effect Productivity Effect Endowment Effect Technology Effect
Table 4: U.S. Competitiveness: MID (1971, 1992)
Comparative Advantage 
Index
Wage Effect Productivity Effect Endowment Effect Technology Effect
Table 4: U.S. Competitiveness: FOD (1971, 1992)
Comparative Advantage 
Index
Wage Effect Productivity Effect Endowment Effect Technology EffectCountry 
Comb
Index 1971 1992 1971 1992 1971 1992 1971 1992 1971 1992
13. AUS . . . . . . . . . .
25. BEL -0.363 0.110 -0.009 0.048 -0.354 0.062 -0.010 -0.020 -0.271 0.188
36.CAN -0.228 -0.079 -0.023 0.045 -0.205 -0.125 -0.040 0.007 -0.183 -0.372
46. DNK -0.700 0.225 0.048 0.191 -0.748 0.034 -0.130 0.000 -0.335 -0.084
55. FRA -0.645 0.032 0.175 0.260 -0.820 -0.228 -0.427 -0.336 -0.234 0.245
63. FIN -0.529 0.108 0.043 0.145 -0.572 -0.037 -0.121 -0.114 -0.342 0.163
70. DEU -0.570 -0.111 0.044 0.205 -0.613 -0.316 -0.260 -0.271 -0.285 -0.083
76. ITA -0.606 -1.235 0.189 -0.853 -0.795 -0.382 -0.068 0.063 -0.683 -0.415
81. JPN -0.128 0.290 0.037 -0.143 -0.165 0.432 -0.405 -0.187 0.255 0.655
85. NLD . . . . . . . . . .
88. NOR -0.306 0.298 0.276 0.285 -0.582 0.013 -0.158 0.040 -0.359 -0.095
90. SWE -0.791 -0.266 0.229 0.298 -1.020 -0.564 -0.308 -0.343 -0.553 -0.109
91. GBR -0.725 0.035 -0.091 -0.060 -0.634 0.095 -0.281 -0.104 -0.166 0.311
Country 
Comb
Index 1971 1992 1971 1992 1971 1992 1971 1992 1971 1992
13. AUS . . . . . . . . . .
25. BEL 0.282 0.336 -0.035 0.020 0.317 0.315 0.199 0.098 0.074 0.169
36.CAN -0.028 -0.080 -0.103 -0.011 0.075 -0.069 -0.162 -0.214 0.179 0.106
46. DNK -0.341 0.398 0.048 0.171 -0.388 0.227 -0.035 0.207 -0.157 -0.127
55. FRA 0.021 0.176 0.126 0.097 -0.105 0.080 -0.259 -0.148 0.139 0.142
63. FIN 0.061 -0.020 0.041 0.131 0.020 -0.151 -0.328 -0.189 0.302 0.055
70. DEU 0.183 -0.057 -0.119 -0.082 0.303 0.026 -0.001 -0.005 0.256 -0.013
76. ITA . . . . . . . . . .
81. JPN 0.173 -0.096 -0.191 -0.015 0.364 -0.081 -0.439 -0.334 0.815 0.172
85. NLD . . . . . . . . . .
88. NOR -0.073 0.330 -0.007 -0.002 -0.065 0.333 -0.113 0.231 0.021 -0.132
90. SWE -0.212 -0.318 -0.111 0.037 -0.101 -0.355 -0.421 -0.339 0.254 0.072
91. GBR -0.037 0.000 -0.054 -0.072 0.017 0.072 0.010 0.151 -0.051 -0.112
Country 
Comb
Index 1971 1992 1971 1992 1971 1992 1971 1992 1971 1992
13. AUS . . . . . . . . . .
25. BEL 1.326 0.309 0.001 -0.005 1.326 0.315 0.125 0.157 1.176 0.118
36.CAN 0.214 0.017 -0.086 -0.107 0.300 0.124 -0.070 -0.100 0.341 0.307
46. DNK -0.062 0.278 -0.096 -0.158 0.034 0.436 0.093 0.388 0.189 -0.050
55. FRA -0.218 -0.122 -0.011 -0.133 -0.207 0.010 -0.353 -0.107 0.133 0.113
63. FIN -0.177 0.027 -0.088 -0.134 -0.089 0.161 0.010 0.076 -0.062 0.110
70. DEU -0.249 0.068 0.008 0.003 -0.257 0.065 0.062 0.217 -0.306 -0.166
76. ITA 1.223 0.922 0.122 0.608 1.101 0.315 0.283 0.540 0.734 -0.259
81. JPN -0.684 -0.467 0.216 0.371 -0.900 -0.838 -0.315 -0.298 -0.498 -0.380
85. NLD . . . . . . . . . .
88. NOR -0.304 0.208 -0.499 -0.546 0.195 0.754 -0.072 0.303 0.452 0.236
90. SWE -0.419 -0.371 -0.216 -0.077 -0.203 -0.295 -0.024 0.035 -0.148 -0.204
91. GBR -0.010 0.031 -0.172 -0.137 0.161 0.168 0.004 0.183 0.128 0.077
Table 4: U.S. Competitiveness: TEX (1971, 1992)
Comparative Advantage 
Index
Wage Effect Productivity Effect Endowment Effect Technology Effect
Table 4: U.S. Competitiveness: PAP (1971, 1992)
Comparative Advantage 
Index
Wage Effect Productivity Effect Endowment Effect Technology Effect
Table 4: U.S. Competitiveness: CHE (1971, 1992)
Comparative Advantage 
Index
Wage Effect Productivity Effect Endowment Effect Technology EffectCountry 
Comb
Index 1971 1992 1971 1992 1971 1992 1971 1992 1971 1992
13. AUS . . . . . . . . . .
25. BEL 0.018 -0.037 -0.129 0.003 0.146 -0.041 0.121 0.099 -0.003 -0.182
36.CAN -0.499 -0.256 0.358 0.061 -0.857 -0.317 -0.213 -0.087 -0.538 -0.347
46. DNK -0.815 -0.025 0.015 -0.016 -0.830 -0.009 -0.115 -0.028 -0.543 -0.105
55. FRA -0.245 -0.225 0.100 0.203 -0.346 -0.428 -0.489 -0.341 0.110 -0.269
63. FIN -0.481 -0.222 -0.042 -0.076 -0.439 -0.146 -0.056 -0.014 -0.317 -0.307
70. DEU -0.238 -0.284 0.007 0.059 -0.246 -0.343 -0.109 -0.097 -0.107 -0.327
76. ITA -0.113 -1.266 -0.115 -1.118 0.002 -0.148 0.109 0.191 -0.061 -0.462
81. JPN -0.464 -0.033 -0.203 0.095 -0.261 -0.128 -0.172 -0.106 -0.129 -0.216
85. NLD . . . . . . . . . .
88. NOR . . . . . . . . . .
90. SWE -0.386 -0.238 0.177 0.080 -0.563 -0.318 -0.223 -0.172 -0.353 -0.394
91. GBR -0.345 -0.210 -0.149 -0.309 -0.196 0.099 0.105 0.223 -0.287 -0.245
Country 
Comb
Index 1971 1992 1971 1992 1971 1992 1971 1992 1971 1992
13. AUS . . . . . . . . . .
25. BEL 0.722 0.145 -0.082 0.105 0.805 0.041 0.149 0.223 0.508 -0.384
36.CAN 0.333 0.028 0.218 0.135 0.115 -0.107 -0.142 -0.087 0.190 0.063
46. DNK 0.411 0.182 -0.085 -0.267 0.496 0.449 0.022 0.169 0.811 0.001
55. FRA 0.542 -0.217 0.025 -0.409 0.516 0.193 -0.355 -0.140 0.746 0.170
63. FIN 0.380 -0.238 -0.145 -0.073 0.525 -0.165 -0.126 0.071 0.482 -0.160
70. DEU 0.406 -0.132 -0.114 -0.143 0.520 0.011 0.006 0.158 0.416 -0.252
76. ITA -0.041 0.516 0.123 0.594 -0.165 -0.078 0.023 0.237 -0.238 -0.369
81. JPN -0.146 -0.433 0.072 0.105 -0.218 -0.537 -0.332 -0.098 0.126 -0.550
85. NLD . . . . . . . . . .
88. NOR 0.705 0.063 0.095 -0.004 0.610 0.067 -0.158 0.261 0.800 -0.303
90. SWE 0.523 -0.287 -0.004 -0.114 0.527 -0.173 -0.280 -0.155 0.760 0.006
91. GBR 0.044 0.017 0.331 0.597 -0.286 -0.579 -0.222 -0.034 -0.223 -0.863
Country 
Comb
Index 1971 1992 1971 1992 1971 1992 1971 1992 1971 1992
13. AUS . . . . . . . . . .
25. BEL 0.024 0.173 -0.150 -0.190 0.174 0.362 0.138 0.212 -0.031 0.088
36.CAN 0.076 -0.152 -0.079 -0.059 0.155 -0.093 0.024 0.040 0.150 -0.153
46. DNK -0.545 0.229 -0.178 -0.274 -0.367 0.504 -0.044 0.258 -0.057 0.119
55. FRA -0.194 -0.031 -0.141 -0.083 -0.054 0.052 -0.379 -0.163 0.318 0.166
63. FIN -0.157 -0.171 -0.158 -0.172 0.002 0.000 -0.090 0.137 0.089 -0.151
70. DEU -0.200 -0.056 -0.128 -0.033 -0.072 -0.023 -0.075 0.021 -0.029 -0.079
76. ITA 0.081 0.545 -0.081 0.497 0.162 0.047 0.038 0.226 0.046 -0.200
81. JPN 0.540 -0.135 -0.194 -0.091 0.734 -0.044 -0.149 0.030 0.810 -0.130
85. NLD . . . . . . . . . .
88. NOR -0.253 0.332 0.096 -0.006 -0.349 0.338 -0.079 0.318 -0.283 -0.131
90. SWE -0.286 -0.217 -0.094 -0.139 -0.192 -0.078 -0.223 -0.065 0.000 -0.027
91. GBR -0.105 -0.161 -0.485 -0.801 0.380 0.639 -0.059 0.161 0.406 0.471
Table 4: U.S. Competitiveness: MNM (1971, 1992)
Comparative Advantage 
Index
Wage Effect Productivity Effect Endowment Effect Technology Effect
Table 4: U.S. Competitiveness: BMI (1971, 1992)
Comparative Advantage 
Index
Wage Effect Productivity Effect Endowment Effect Technology Effect
Table 4: U.S. Competitiveness: MEQ (1971, 1992)
Comparative Advantage 
Index
Wage Effect Productivity Effect Endowment Effect Technology EffectCountry 
Comb
Index 1971 1992 1971 1992 1971 1992 1971 1992 1971 1992
13. AUS . . . . . . . . . .
25. BEL -0.429 0.049 -0.088 -0.170 -0.341 0.219 -0.177 -0.149 -0.050 0.304
36.CAN 0.019 0.149 -0.348 -0.114 0.366 0.263 0.217 0.103 0.093 0.120
46. DNK -0.830 -0.075 -0.097 -0.064 -0.733 -0.011 0.131 0.092 -0.566 0.056
55. FRA . . . . . . . . . .
63. FIN -0.345 0.080 0.070 -0.041 -0.415 0.121 -0.171 -0.074 -0.197 0.221
70. DEU -0.416 -0.183 -0.144 -0.050 -0.272 -0.133 -0.080 -0.205 -0.222 0.141
76. ITA -0.600 0.568 -0.193 0.475 -0.408 0.093 -1.491 -1.422 1.155 1.497
81. JPN -0.141 0.298 0.020 0.051 -0.161 0.246 -0.020 0.106 -0.194 0.175
85. NLD . . . . . . . . . .
88. NOR . . . . . . . . . .
90. SWE 1.302 1.537 -0.331 -0.317 1.633 1.854 0.125 0.629 1.298 1.072
91. GBR -0.274 0.055 0.858 0.700 -1.132 -0.645 -1.321 -1.203 0.151 0.525
 The observation for 1971.
 The observation for 1992.
Bold   The U.S. has a comparative advantage over other countries.
Table 4: U.S. Competitiveness: MOT (1971, 1992)
Comparative Advantage 
Index
Wage Effect Productivity Effect Endowment Effect Technology Effect